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ABSTRACT      
 
The creation of novelty and its subsequent retention or elimination by evolutionary mechanisms 
is a central theme in complexity studies. By examining the evolution of three information and 
communication technologies, this paper explores linkages between variety generation, selection 
and propagation. Tensions are identified between the benefits of variety to meet diverse user 
needs and the value of standardization to facilitate exchange. In ICT industries, the usefulness of 
a product or service increases with numbers of users. The benefits of interoperability, the 
facilitation of complementary technologies around a standard and user switching costs are among 
network externalities. These contribute to the emergence of dominant designs and standard 
protocols, which reduce the variety of enabling or platform technologies but increase 
complementary product and process innovations. The linkages between evolutionary selection 
and propagation in ICT have accelerated the pace of innovation, but could in principle have the 
reverse effect, unless the effects of asymmetries of market power and proprietary standards are 
offset. Long term support for science and technology and entrepreneurial activity provide 
exogenous sources of variety that can renew innovation. 
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I   Introduction 
 
The creation of novel forms and the effects of their subsequent selection or elimination is a 
central theme in complexity studies.  Complex processes are at work whenever their outcomes 
impact on further activity in iterations that generate recurrent feedback processes. In Darwinian 
theory, sources of variation are independent of the selection which occurs through the elimination 
of non-adaptive variants. But in the evolution of technologies there are close linkages between 
the selection and generation of variants and their propagation, instead of each mechanism 
operating independently as in natural selection. While in natural systems the generation of variety 
is random and blind, in social systems, variety is often guided by desired outcomes since the 
experience of selection can contribute to learning. Uncertainty as to actual outcomes encourages 
a variety of responses, which together generate diversity of economic activity and outcome.  
 
Evolutionary processes are not simply a biological metaphor when applied outside the natural 
world, but a distinctive mode of transformation in areas that include the evolution of languages, 
the development scientific knowledge and the advance of technologies. Evolution operate in a 
distinctive way in different arenas but there are common processes at work. Natural variety is 
generated through random genetic mutation and combination, blind to selection forces. But in the 
economy, intelligent agents can anticipate the rewards and sanctions exerted by selection forces, 
and so experience incentives to respond to them.1  Consumer demand, the allocation of 
investment and competition have operated as selection forces shaping the advance of information 
technologies in recent years. 
 
It is increasingly recognized that co-evolution operates as a meta-evolutionary process in which 
the interaction of participants contributes to the collective creation of a habitat that shapes their 
prospects (Goodwin, 1994). Co-evolution is the collective outcome of responses (whether or not 
intentional) and feedback effects that accommodate other participants in the system. Selected 
forms of mutual accommodation or symbiosis, can occur without intentionality when blind 
accommodating responses are rewarded by survival, or can be pursued purposively by human 
agents. In other words new variants may be engendered in anticipation of selection conditions, or 
without prior regard to their likely reception which occurs post hoc through natural selection, 
                                                 
1
 “ … while no treatment of innovation can ignore a stochastic element, it is also true that innovation represents guided and 
intentional variation purposely undertaken in the pursuit of competitive advantage. Economic agents learn from experience and 
anticipate future states of the selective environment in a way quite unknown in biological or ecological selection.” (Metcalfe, 
1998) 
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though in a setting where fitness is related to capacity to fit into a co-evolving eco-system. When 
new variants are crafted in anticipation of the selective response, this accelerates the evolution of 
human artifacts if the selection regime favours innovation but may not do so when selection 
conditions are less conducive to change.  
 
The focus of this chapter is on the linkages between evolutionary mechanisms in the emergence 
of new technologies. They are explored through examples in semiconductors, personal computers 
and electronic messaging. In these sectors, new ventures have been the agents of major 
innovations, raising questions about the way variety is engendered. Among other radical 
innovations produced by entrepreneurial entrants are the telephone, electric light, radio 
broadcasting, photocopying and bio-synthesised insulin (see e.g. Nairn, 2000, McKelvey, 1996), 
suggesting that this is a feature of the way technology advances. We pursue three further 
questions about evolutionary mechanisms in connection with ICT innovations.  
 
1. What were the origins of the knowledge exploited by entrepreneurial ventures to produce 
innovations? 
2. What were the mechanisms connecting variety generation and selection processes in the 
evolution of these technologies? 
3. What were the mechanisms connecting selection processes and the propagation of these 
technologies?  Did this involve further variety creation? 
  
A complexity approach is used here to explore how small beginnings led to world-changing 
developments. The outcomes of evolutionary feedback processes cannot be forecast in any detail 
in natural or social systems subject to interactive feedback effects. But a complexity perspective 
can identify common dynamic processes that are not evident from the historical record alone, nor 
from cross sectional analysis. This study reveals a persistent dynamic operating between the 
diversity of user needs – met by multiple technical solutions – and the uniformities that make 
interchange possible. This emerges as a central feature of co-evolution. The study finds that this 
dynamic has until now accelerated technological evolution in ICT and identifies reasons why 
rapid innovation may not continue indefinitely without countervailing policies. 
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II   Industries and Innovations 
 
Co-evolution occurs within an environment made up of producers and users. The conventional 
definition of industries is in terms of competing producers of classes of products (Barney, 1997). 
When the focus is the characteristic structure of an industry, the unaddressed issues are how 
industries emerge and are transformed over time. It has been proposed that a new industry 
consists of competing producer webs or networks: “a broad group of firms struggling to shape or 
influence the perceived value, nature, and technique for carrying out a particular activity” (Munir 
and Phillips, 2002 p.294). According to this perspective, it is not until an emerging technology 
matures that industries take on their characteristic structure after an early period of producer 
network activity. But from a complexity perspective, network activity is not confined to 
producers but extends to user or consumer groups and related organizations including 
professional organisations and standards bodies. These networks make up ecosystems of related 
production and consumption (Moore, 1996). Nor are production webs just a transitional feature 
of emerging industries; production networks persist and evolve in interaction with user groups 
and other participants in a business ecosystem. 
 
In the next section we review the early emergence of the information technology and 
communications sector. We attempt to trace feedback connections between variety generation, 
selection and propagation. We go on to examine the swarming of innovations that occurred as the 
density of complementary technologies increased, and view the boom and slump as a further 
manifestation of complexity.   
 
2.1. Semiconductors: the Integrated Circuit and Central Processing Unit 
 
It was in the R&D laboratory of a successful early entrant to the electricity industry, Bell 
Laboratories, that the transistor was created in 1947. Constructed from semiconductor materials 
such as germanium and silicon, the transistor allowed the magnification of electronic impulses. It 
required less current, generated less heat, and was over fifty times smaller than the vacuum tubes 
earlier used for this purpose (Wolfe, 1983). With US government grants that continued into the 
Cold War, Bell Labs was funded in some respects like a public sector research institute. Within 
about five years, transistors were reliable enough for commercial use. They were exploited not by 
established companies, but by a maverick employee of Bell Labs, William Shockley, one of the 
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co-inventors of the transistor. Returning to his home town Palo Alto, he set up a company, 
Shockley Semiconductors in 1955, to pursue opportunities opened up by the transistor.   
 
This was the origin of a swarm of entrepreneurial endeavours that created the semiconductor 
sector in Silicon Valley, largely through multi-generational spin-outs. Shockley fell out with his 
employees, who left and started up their own firms. The first spin-out was Fairchild 
Semiconductors, originally a joint venture, and the first company to work exclusively in silicon. 
It was at Fairchild Semiconductors that, in 1959, Robert Noyce invented the integrated circuit, 
which combined a number of transistors, diodes, resistors and capacitors onto a single piece of 
semiconductor. Ten years later, Noyce had spun out his own company, Intel, with Gordon 
Moore. Within two years Noyce and Moore had developed the 1103 memory chip, the size of 
two letters in a line of type, each chip containing four thousand transistors. “At the end of Intel's 
first year in business, which had been devoted almost exclusively to research, sales totalled less 
than three thousand dollars and the work force numbered forty-two. In 1972, thanks largely to the 
1103 chip, sales were $23.4 million and the work force numbered 1,002. In the next year sales 
almost tripled, to $66 million, and the work force increased two and a half times, to 2,528” 
(Wolfe, 1983). Other semiconductor ventures were drawn by these high returns, the numbers 
fuelled by large numbers of engineers produced by universities in the US and by employee 
departures to found new spin outs. By 1972 there were 330 semiconductor manufacturing firms 
in the United States (Freeman, 1995 p.234). 
 
At Intel, Noyce aimed to hire the best people. One of these was Ted Hoff, who had spent over ten 
years in research at Stanford University when he was invited to join Intel. He designed a 
microprocessor2 at Intel in response to a request from Japanese manufacturer for specially 
designed chips for their desk-top calculators.3 He packed all the central processing unit (CPU) 
functions of a minicomputer onto a single chip. At first the Intel marketing team were not 
convinced of the prospects for the microprocessor because the processing power was viewed as 
insufficient. But the improved Intel 8080 that came out in 1973 was twenty times faster than the 
first 4004 chip. Intel’s core business was in computer memory, a sector which it dominated 
despite the numerous firms entering the sector (Grove, 1996). It did not at first recognise the 
                                                 
2 A microprocessor is an integrated circuit designed to carry out most of the processing and control functions of a computer. 
3 Texas Instruments, where the integrated circuit had independently been invented, become Intel’s first competitor in the 
microprocessor market, coming out with their own chip to meet the specifications of one of Intel’s customers. 
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importance of the microprocessor, but the miniature size and increasing power of Intel’s new 
products provided the core technology for the microcomputer industry.  
 
2.2. The Microcomputer 
 
Digital computers were developed in the 1940s, heavily funded by defence spending at IBM and 
elsewhere. During the 1960s and 1970s computing facilities became progressively more 
accessible with the introduction of timeshare systems and minicomputers. However, computers 
remained complex and expensive until the mid 1970s when the invention of the microprocessor 
made possible the development of the microcomputer. 
 
The early days of the microcomputer provided new scope for entrepreneurs. The first ideas came 
largely from amateurs keen to gain access to digital computing. Entrepreneurial ventures 
experimented to create a variety of kits for these hobbyists, connecting up electronic components 
to the increasingly powerful chips available from young semiconductor companies. The first 
commercial microcomputer, the Altair, launched by a small business, MITS, in Albuquerque in 
1975 had as its core Intel’s 8-bit 8080 microprocessor. Hobbyist user groups supplied ideas for 
applications, such as games, music, databases and personal accounting. Small third party 
suppliers sprung up to provide software and add-ons. A compiler for the BASIC computer 
language was provided by young drop-outs from Harvard, Bill Gates and Paul Allen. Demand for 
the Altair outstripped supply and imitations were soon available based on the S-100 bus 
architecture and CP/M operating system of the Altair. New ventures, drawn to the emerging 
market, were experimenting with alternative designs and by 1977 a number of improved products 
were available, including the Commodore PET, Tandy TRS-80 and Apple II, each using their 
own operating systems and a variety of chips (e.g. the Motorola 6800; Zilog Z80). The Apple II, 
conceived as a consumer product by the young Steve Jobs, attracted customers well beyond the 
hobbyist market and sales increased from $750k in 1977, to $983m in 1983. At this early stage, 
the design of microcomputers included most of the now familiar elements: a microprocessor unit, 
a keyboard, a storage device and a monitor.  
 
Users fuelled demand for microcomputers. In established computer companies, engineers were 
ordering their own microcomputers to by-pass interaction with the mainframe computers which 
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then dominated the business market. As the ‘toy computers’ improved their performance, they 
made inroads into the markets of both mainframe computers and the more recent generation of 
mini-computers, produced by companies like Digital Equipment Corporation and Wang.4 Mini-
computers were more accessible than mainframes but still costly and beyond the reach of 
ordinary consumers and small businesses.  
 
The emerging market also attracted the attention of what was then the world’s largest computer 
manufacturer, IBM. The first IBM Personal Computer (PC), launched in 1981, was innovative in 
introducing the first 16-bit microprocessor used in a microcomputer, the Intel 8088 chip. IBM’s 
entry into the microcomputer market attracted buyers in the business sector, faithful to its brand. 
IBM calculated that an open standard would encourage the production of software and IBM-
compatible complementary products, enhancing their product. Users and suppliers were ready for 
a new standard that would allow for variation around a common format. The advent of the IBM 
PC contributed to the early industry shakeout and closure of many firms with 8-bit products. 
Apple co-founder Steve Wozniak explained the need for markets to set standards in terms 
reminiscent of complexity ideas: 
 
You’ve got to let end users develop their own standards … when a new market 
evolves like PCs did, there’s a period of time when you’ve got to let the world go in 
random directions and eventually it will subside because it wants standardisation. 
(Langlois, 1992 p.45)   
 
Apple did not make its proprietary technology available as an open standard. 5 This prevented the 
pioneer from gaining licensing revenues and creating an alliance of companies using its operating 
system. In the UK, another pioneer, Acorn Computers, also followed a proprietary strategy, not 
anticipating that in an industry reliant on complementary products, customers would soon shun a 
minority system incompatible with the industry standard. After the emergence of a dominant 
design in the form of the IBM PC, the numbers of exits from the industry exceeded the number 
of entries, resulting in a fall in producer numbers reminiscent of other complex assembled 
product industries examined by Utterback (1995). 
                                                 
4
 Minicomputers were more accessible than mainframes but still costly and beyond the reach of ordinary consumers and small 
businesses.  
5 Apple’s new CEO John Sculley had previously guarded the Pepsi recipe, though he continued a policy that had been 
established by Apple’s founders. 
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                                                               Source: International Data Corporation PC database  
Figure 1.  Entry, exit and total number of firms, PC sector 1974-1995 
 
IBM had not themselves anticipated the widespread imitation of their PC, which they viewed as a 
provisional product for a small market. The company secured very limited intellectual property 
for their system. By outsourcing the PC’s operating system from Microsoft without requiring an 
exclusive license beyond the first 12 months, IBM encouraged other producers to provide 
peripheral complementary products that enhanced the value of the PC. But they also made it easy 
for competitors to produce rival products, PC clones, which also worked on Microsoft’s 
operating system using components readily available on the market. The most successful of the 
companies to introduce PC compatible models, Compaq (founded in 1982) was soon in direct 
competition with IBM and achieved revenues of over $1,000m by 1987.  
 
In an attempt to regain control of the standard, 1987, IBM introduced its PS/2 Personal System 
product range with proprietary logic chips and interface standards. IBM ceased production of its 
previous PC models, but this only encouraged sales of PC clone makers; Compaq’s profits 
tripled in three months in 1987 as exits from the industry rose. But ultimately, it was not the 
hardware producers that came to dominate the PC industry; hardware and software are 
interconnected and the user experience is more closely associated with software. By 1987, 
Microsoft’s operating system, MS-DOS, was in use in hundreds of cloned products and had 
become the basis for a multitude of other software applications.  Other companies with operating 
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systems technically superior to MS-DOS found to their cost that the market was locked into MS-
DOS. European producers of PCs were soon eliminated in the international market as Figure 2 
shows for leading UK producers. 
          Source: Langlois, 1992 pp. 34-35 
Figure 2. Worldwide Market Share of Leading UK Producers of Microcomputers 
 
Microsoft and Intel emerged from the industry shakedown as the dominant players in the 
industry. Microsoft had begun as a small supplier, but gained crucial leverage through its 
partnership with IBM when it was able to license the DOS operating system to PC clone 
producers.  Microsoft’s revenues grew with the rapid expansion of the PC market, taking off 
around 1987, the year when the dominance of the PC was established.  
 
As microcomputers reached a wider range of users, ease of use and accessibility became 
important factors. The Graphical User Interface (GUI), first demonstrated by Xerox in the mid 
1970s, was seen as a way of facilitating human-computer interaction, and received clear customer 
endorsement when successfully implemented by Apple. In response to this perceived threat, 
Microsoft introduced its Windows product in 1985, a graphical front end to DOS. Maintaining 
DOS beneath Windows ensured backward compatibility and avoided alienating the established 
customer base. Though it would be a further five years before Windows could be regarded as a 
fully functioning GUI, Windows software became a feature of the dominant PC design.  
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                                                                 Calculated from Cusumano and Selby, 1996 
Figure 3. Microsoft’s growth took off with the market expansion of the PC 
 
The personal computer industry provided a market for a wide range of components and 
complementary products. The PC provides an example of diversity reduction (convergence onto 
a basic product design) giving rise to extensive variety generation around the new standard. More 
firms entered the industry because they were confident of a market for products compatible with 
the standard. Thus, even as diversity diminished in the architecture of the PC and its office 
software, new generations of improvement were made in components and peripherals. DRAM 
(dynamic random access memory) for example increased in speed by a factor of 500 between 
1975 and 2003, while prices have reduced by a factor of 190,000. Hard disk drives also increased 
in both speed and capacity while reducing in price, from 5MB and US$2,000 in 1980, to 120GB 
at US$125 in 2003. Meanwhile printers advanced from monochrome dot-matrix models to low 
cost colour inkjet and laser printers with similar reductions in cost. The rate of change was 
enshrined in what has come to be known as “Moore’s Law” which has been used since the late 
1980s to refer to exponential increases in computing performance.6 The factors supporting this 
empirical generalisation were complex. Market forces were operative, but US government 
funding of information technologies and South East Asian government support for their 
emerging semiconductor industries, were enabling factors making possible the massive 
improvement in the performance and yield of computer chips and increasing miniaturization.  
                                                 
6 In 1965, Gordon Moore, then a Director of Fairchild Semiconductor, observed that the number of components on a cost-
effective silicon wafer had doubled each year since 1959.  He predicted that this rate of increase would continue for a further 10 
years.  In 1975, Moore extended his prediction, but this time referred to the maximum complexity over 2 year periods. The 
period of the effect is frequently quoted as 18 months (e.g. EC, 2000; Cringely, 1996). 
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2.3. A Critical Transition to Connectivity: Electronic Messaging 
 
By the early 1990s, the computing power of the desktop PC had reached a level achieved only by 
minicomputers and workstations a decade earlier. Largely as a result of the advances in IT 
supported by these developments, a critical shift took place in the key attribute of PCs. 
Improvements in memory and processing speed had become required rather than winning 
attributes for sales, since competing PC makers used the same semiconductor chip suppliers. It 
was the connectivity of PCs that provided opportunities for meeting user needs in a new way, 
leading to the emergence of a new communications sector, electronic messaging. 
  
The standardisation of communication protocols was first required for PCs to become the vehicle 
for a new form of electronic communication. TCP/IP protocols had been developed as part of the 
US Military’s ARPANet, the origin of the Internet.7 These had become the standard for 
connecting PCs to local computing system servers and servers to each other. The development of 
the World Wide Web facilitated Internet usage as it provided a common set of protocols for 
access and storage of information through the Internet. The Web was made possible by small 
amounts of European public sector funding at CERN and discretionary time being accorded to 
one employee, Tim Berners-Lee (Berners-Lee and Fischetti, 2000). He saw that uniformity of 
standards was needed to support new forms of diversity. His entrepreneurial efforts were directed 
towards social rather than commercial returns. The Web illustrates the unintended impact of 
public sector funding in enabling work that was required to achieve standards but would not offer 
a commercial payback.   
 
Once again the role of new entrants in taking up opportunities for this form of variety generation 
is demonstrated. Lack of insight among newly established players can be observed in the failure 
of Microsoft and IBM to anticipate the importance of the Internet. As in the case of the 
microprocessor and the microcomputer, new ventures were the first to seize new opportunities 
opened by the ease of communication between users’ microcomputers. Netscape and Cisco 
Systems were set up by entrepreneurs who transferred technologies that had been developed in 
universities. Netscape (founded in 1994 as Mosaic) was a spinout from the government-
                                                 
7
 TCP/IP stands for Transfer Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, 2 sets of rules that allow computers and networks to 
communicate effectively.  The ARPANET originally used NCP, for communication, but the TCP was devised to enable 
ARPANET to communicate with other networks, i.e. the early Internet.  It was adopted by the US DoD in 1980 and was 
introduced to the ARPANET in 1983 (Zakon, 2003). 
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supported computer science department at Michigan University and pioneered a graphical web 
browser. Cisco was a spin-out from Stanford based on federally funded LAN research. It 
provided the servers and routers necessary for large scale PC network infrastructure. Netscape 
was one of the first companies to base its success on freeware. Nurtured in the ‘gift culture’ of 
the government funded IT community, Netscape’s entrepreneurs were among the first to see that 
propagation might require giving it away initially and earning returns on enhancements or future 
related products. 
 
The technology and standards underpinning the Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW) serve 
as enablers for a wide range of applications, from e-commerce to online gaming. Connectivity 
extended the use of the PC beyond word and data processing to the provision of a data and 
communications portal. In the office, more people were using a computer for internet-based tasks 
(including email) than for word processing or Desk Top Publishing and user-to-user contact 
through electronic messaging proved to be the most common use of the Internet (BLS, 2001).  
 
After nearly twenty years in which electronic mail had been used by professionals to 
communicate with each other, PCs had the computer power and the Internet infrastructure was in 
place to make it possible to link users to each other on a massive scale. Pioneering firms 
experimented with business models aimed at providing this new form of communication from 
1993. Influenced by Netscape, Hotmail’s entrepreneurs conceived the idea of providing free e-
mail accounts on the Internet leaving users to set up their own account with Internet Service 
Providers, so reducing Hotmail’s costs to the point where, with revenue from advertisers, they 
could provide a free service. By 1997, four hundred further new entrants swarmed into the sector 
as participants in the Internet boom of the late 1990s (Hugo and Garnsey, 2002).   
  
Established companies did not initially detect that the Internet had commercial potential as 
significant if not more so, than hardware and applications for isolated PCs.8 But the expansion of 
email communication was unprecedented. Between 1993 and 1997 use expanded to reach a 
reputed 50 million. Hotmail alone acquired seven million users between 1996 and 1997.  
                                                 
8 Until 1995, Internet use was limited to non-commercial applications, though some commercial activities had begun in the early 
1990s. 
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          Source: Meeker, 1996 
Figure 4. Time Taken to Reach 50 Million Users 
 
As soon the success of the Internet pioneers came into view, Microsoft was quick to engage in 
Schumpeterian imitation, pursuing its policy of acquiring new entrants with promising 
technologies. The best known was Hotmail, acquired for $400m in 1997. Adapting the concept 
of providing free software in order to attract customers, Microsoft soon bundled its web browser 
with Windows software. Since Microsoft software was standard with PC purchases, Microsoft’s 
browser, Internet Explorer, effectively put Netscape out of business. 
 
III   Discussion: Unique Developments and Common Processes 
 
We return to the questions raised in the introduction concerning linkages between variety 
creation, selection and propagation processes and ask them of the ICT sector. A complexity 
approach reveals a persistent dynamic operating between the diversity of user needs – met by 
multiple technical solutions – and the uniformities that make interchange possible. This dynamic 
interplay between variety and uniformity has provided the impetus for complementary and 
compatible innovations. As complementary technologies matured, increasing returns promoted 
an economic boom, but as asynchronies built up they precipitated the ensuing slump, a recurrent 
feature of rapid technological advance. 
 
3.1. The agents of variety generation and the origins of their knowledge 
 
Co-evolution did not occur immediately. Unrelated experiments took place around an enabling 
technology before producers came up with products at a price and with specifications attractive 
to consumers.  Entrepreneurial firms hit upon innovative solutions as they sought to exploit 
business opportunities in the face of stringent resource constraints. Early periods of ferment of 
this kind have been identified in many other industries (Utterback, 1994; Nairn, 2000). Variety 
generation was in each of these examples made possible by new knowledge developed with the 
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support of public funding and made available in the public domain. Entrepreneurs with relevant 
experience and expertise were able to perceive and pursue the opportunities offered by 
knowledge newly entering the public domain.  
 
A pool of knowledge representing an investment of time and effort forms outside the market 
arena for two main reasons. Firstly, scientific knowledge undergoes its own evolutionary 
processes and advances create an independent problem-solving potential that may have 
unexpected market applications. Secondly, the payback anticipated from funding the 
commercialisation of research seldom attracts market investors, who look for earlier and more 
certain returns on capital.9 In the case of transistors, microcomputers and electronic messaging, 
established companies had access to scientific and technological knowledge, and in some cases 
involvement in their development, with support from public funds. However,   entrepreneurial 
ventures had no vested interests in prior technologies and ways of organizing business, and had 
no existing customers to alienate or reputation to sully by offering a product based on immature 
technology. 
 
In semiconductors, technological performance depended on a pool of resource provided by the 
public sector, no less than on market forces. Although the transistor, integrated circuit and 
microprocessor were invented in private companies, Bell Labs, Fairchild and Intel, there were 
years of technical expertise funded by government behind their inventions. Major federal 
contracts supported development work and the Small Business Innovation Research programme 
(SBIR) made it possible for new entrepreneurial firms to access this funding (Wessner, 2003).  
Shockley, Fairchild and others employed large numbers of PhDs trained in universities supported 
by government funding. At Intel, the creator of the microprocessor, Ted Hoff, came straight from 
research at Stanford. The US defense department supported scientific and technical education in 
universities on an unprecedented scale (Lowen, 1997).  
 
The microcomputer is often cited as an industry that was the product of pure enterprise without 
government subsidy (Fong, 2001). But here too the costs of developing the technologies that 
went into such features as the graphical user interface (GUI), the mouse and the local area 
network (LAN), were not borne wholly by the market. The Defense Advanced Research Projects 
                                                 
9
 This argument is by no means universally accepted.  For instance, Kealey (1996) argues that government funding displaces 
commercial funding in a ratio of greater than 1:1.  He suggests that the majority of government funding of science is only 
necessary because it is now the accepted norm.  The evidence of the three cases presented here indicates that government funding 
played an important part in the generation of variety. 
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Agency (DARPA) was heavily involved. DARPA provided extensive support for selected 
computer science departments throughout the US, including UC Berkeley and Stanford. DARPA 
funds made possible the accelerated development of graphics through the sponsorship of the 
CAD industry and through support for the computer scientists who developed GUI advances and 
LANs (Hafner and Lyon, 1996). DARPA employed and supported the knowledge generation of 
many of those who were later active in Xerox PARC in Palo Alto, the home of developments that 
inspired Apple’s Macintosh computer and ultimately Microsoft Windows (Fong, 2001). Much 
DARPA related business was carried out at Xerox PARC itself (Hafner and Lyon, 1996 p.238). 
Without Cold War defense funding, the microcomputer industry could not have grown so 
quickly. A pool of knowledge funded outside the market and accessible to new ventures 
compensated for the short-term focus of capital markets. The success of these sectors made 
possible the expansion of commercial venture capital. 
 
Both the Internet and the World Wide Web, which were necessary underpinnings for online 
electronic messaging, emerged from government-funded activities, the former from the US 
ARPANET, and the latter from the work of Tim Berners-Lee at CERN. Again, it was 
entrepreneurs who identified and acted to exploit the opportunities in a variety of ways 
apparently not foreseen by the original developers and funders. In these sectors, variety 
generation was facilitated by historically and culturally specific conditions. The San Francisco 
Bay area provided a creative and unconventional culture that encouraged innovation. The ‘gift 
culture’ in IT, which stimulated technology diffusion, was made possible in part because US 
defense expenditure to provided munificent resources for IT development during the Cold War. 
The anti-trust tendencies of the judiciary led large companies to make available innovative 
technologies, including RISC and UNIX, for licensing on favourable terms (Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1998).  
 
Scientific knowledge created with government support was not sufficient to create an IT 
economy. This is illustrated by the contrast with the Soviet Union, where the absence of 
incentives and market mechanisms for transforming scientific advances into industrial innovation 
prevented the command economy’s transition to the information age (Mowery, 1996). However, 
market mechanisms represented “…only one level and mode of selection” (Metcalfe, 1994 p.29). 
Cultural factors, government policy and institutions that included the universities and standards 
setting bodies were part of the co-evolutionary process from which complementary innovations 
emerged in the US. In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, public support for industrial research and 
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production made possible the increases in corporate production capacity and skills that raised 
yields and sustained rates of improved performance of semiconductors alongside massive 
reduction of costs (e.g. Kim, 1997). Asian public expenditure helped sustain Moore’s Law. 
 
3.2. Feedback Mechanisms Connecting Variety Generation, Selection and Propagation 
 
3.2.1. User-producer interaction and learning 
 
Technologies are not simply selected in the marketplace on the basis of pre-given price and 
quality attributes, but are constructed and refined through a collaborative learning process 
(Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987). Early input-output computing kits like the Altair became the 
personal computer through user involvement.  Learning on the part of providers and users 
continue to shape developments as markets mature. Early customers for a new product, looking 
for a new solution, are prepared to accept relatively unreliable products with complex interfaces 
(Rogers, 1983). As a wider range of users is reached, usability and reliability become key 
requirements. In the PC sector early adopters used the machines to write their own programs but 
by the early 1980s pre-packaged applications took over in consumer markets. 
 
3.2.2. Competitive selection around standards 
 
In networked industries, users benefit as the number of users of an innovation increases.10 Katz 
and Shapiro identified 3 sources of consumption externalities from which users benefit in 
networked industries. (1) The direct physical effect of the number of purchasers, as might be 
found with a telephone system where utility increases with the number of connections. (2) 
Indirect effects such as the availability of associated products, as might be seen with software for 
a particular type of computer hardware, or pre-recorded tapes for videocassette recorders. (3) 
Support effects, whereby the quality and availability of post-purchase service depends upon the 
experience and size of the service network (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). If these benefits are to be 
experienced, products must be compatible with each other, calling for agreed, imposed or de 
facto technical standards.  
                                                 
10
 Bob Metcalfe hypothesised that the utility of a network was proportional to the square of the number of users (Rohlfs 2001). 
Rohlf points out that this ‘law’ assumes that the value that users derive from a networked product or service is the same for all 
users, but  in reality some users will derive more value than others and links with different users have differential value. While 
the insight is valid this statement of it is incorrect and likely to overstate the value of large networks. 
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There are also advantages in common focus on a given set of production problems. Pressures to 
standardize the wide range of new variants launched by the early experimental phase of a newly 
commercialised technology result in the emergence of a dominant design of an assembled 
product, as in the ‘keyboard, monitor, processor’ features of the PC. This is pivotal for the 
formation of an industry in the conventional sense of a set of producers producing competing 
products (Utterback, 1994; Munir and Phillips, 2002). A related development is a set of technical 
standards that promote interoperability. These include protocols for connectivity in 
telecommunications and the media or common interfaces modes in hardware and software.11 In 
the three sectors examined, variety generation and selection interacted around the adoption of 
technical standards. Once a specific technical standard is selected, switching costs are created for 
consumers who have invested funds and knowledge in that standard. A path dependent lock-in of 
this kind helps to explain why the market does not always select the best performing technology 
(Arthur, 1990; Rohlf 2001.43). 
 
3.2.3. Network Externalities Reinforce Selection 
 
In the network products we have reviewed, the need for products to be compatible or support 
interoperability was a critical factor in determining the survival of firms offering early 
experimental designs. The emergence of a preferred solution changes the competitive 
environment to provide an advantage to those firms that adopt the standard as compared with 
those that have non-standard products (Tegarden et al., 1999). For products in these markets, 
selection and propagation are not empirically separable. The rapid propagation of winning 
products results in the selection of these products by new adopters, with increasing sales tipping 
the likelihood of further sales in the winners’ direction.  
 
The combination of selection and propagation acts as a self-reinforcing process so that the 
market power of dominant players is increased. In theory, when network effects operate at the 
limit, there can be a change in phase state, from competing technologies to the emergence of a 
clear winner. This occurs as new users head for what becomes the market’s preferred technology 
and some existing users also move over to this emerging dominant standard. 
 
                                                 
11
 Connectivity protocols include TCP/IP for local area networks and IEEE 802.11 for wireless (“wi-fi”) networks. Physical 
connections such as PCI, SCSI and USB provide hardware interfaces; device drivers and programming languages provide the 
interface between software and hardware. 
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A rapid shift of this kind occurred in the emerging PC industry. An incremental increase in sales 
of IBM PC software produced a cascade effect, leading to the selection of the IBM PC at the 
expense of Apple products. In 1982, software for Apple had made up about 85% of the 
microcomputer software market but it fell to 35% within a year with the rapid expansion of  
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Source: adapted from Agliardi, 1998 p.62  
Figure 5. Network effects illustrated by Probability of Adoption Curve 
 
software applications for the IBM PC. Apple’s market share halved between 1981 and 1984 and 
continued to fall, while IBM’s expanded to 33% of the global market by 1984 (Gabel, 1991 
p.24).  As early as 1987 over 80% of the market was compatible with the IBM PC (Grindley, 
1995 p.140). Buyers’ preference was the overt mechanism of selection in the PC sector which led 
to the elimination of non-compatible systems such as Apple’s. 
 
3.3. Path dependence and the Acceleration of Innovation 
 
Innovation in the ICT sector took the form of specialist niche activity, with these niches 
providing a favourable environment for new entrant growth. As technologies matured, certain 
niches expanded to become mainstream markets attracting complementary activity. Those 
producers of bandwagon products that acquired a massive user set enjoyed great competitive 
advantage. But some niches survived where the needs of particular markets were met.  
 
The increasing diffusion and interoperability of PCs resulting from earlier advances drove the 
emergence of electronic messaging, enabled by the Internet and World Wide Web. Further 
progress in PC processing and memory enabled advances in other hardware and software sectors, 
notably telecommunications and image processing. A new conjuncture in computer and 
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communications was to be seen in mobile devices and handheld computers. In each of these 
cases, technological advances built on what had gone before, in the path dependent mode created 
by cumulative feedback processes. 
 
The pace of change was accelerated by interactivities, increasing the difficulty of predicting and 
synchronising innovative products, services and modes of provision. Schumpeter argued that the 
swarming of innovations was responsible not only for “leaps and bounds of progress” but also for 
setbacks “carrying in their wake not only the primary disturbance, inherent in the process, but a 
whole string of secondary ones and the possibilities ... of crises.” (Schumpeter, 1928 p.384) He 
recognised that difficulties in assimilating bursts of disruptive innovation can set off periodic 
disturbances in the economy. 
  
As complex dynamic systems, industries are prone to surge effects in the intensity of innovative 
activity. Such surges provide impetus to technological progress, but they create asynchronies and 
disturbances with unpredictable outcomes. There are historically specific factors at work. In the 
late 1990s, when stock market speculation led to the boom and bust of Internet ventures 
incentives exerted by increasing use of share options for managers and the rapid dismantling of 
regulatory controls were among the precipitating factors (Stiglitz, 2003). Speculative bubbles 
have in the past arisen as returns from new forms of investment rose well above the other sources 
of return on capital (Nairn 2000).  Even once it was clear that share values of technology 
ventures were out of line with possibilities for real returns, investors feared losses from pulling 
out too soon (Cassidy, 2001). Events then precipitated a sudden shift in investor sentiment 
through tipping effects, as demonstrated by the NASDAQ Index before and after the Millenium.  
 
When a speculative bubble bursts it is more difficult for new projects to obtain funding, so 
bringing about a lull in variety creation. The disturbances predicted by Schumpeter spread 
throughout telecommunications industry and also reduced funding for biotechnology ventures 
post-Millennium. 
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                                               Source: Yahoo Finance http://finance.yahoo.com  
Figure 6. NASDAQ Exchange Monthly Closing Values 1984-2002 
 
IV   Diversity, Uniformity and Innovation 
 
Despite contrary historical evidence, we tend to assume that the future will be like the past. A 
complexity approach leads us to expect that continuity will be challenged by reactions to current 
conditions and consequent feedback effects. In this final section we explore some of the 
difficulties of predicting co-evolutionary developments when complex dynamic processes are at 
work. 
 
The Darwinian evolution of life forms takes place unimaginably slowly, the evolutionary 
mechanisms of variety generation, selection and propagation occurring independently of each 
other. The random emergence of new variants and the elimination of those that are less adaptive 
takes place over ‘deep time’. Survival rewards for mutual accommodation have been found to 
underlie co-evolution (Goodwin, 1994). In the natural world, collaboration is not pursued 
because its benefits are envisaged, but through blind responses that sustain mutual advantages. 
 
In contrast with the Darwinian process, advances in IC technologies have been occurring ever 
faster as evolutionary mechanisms in ICT have become more closely coupled. While there are 
reasons to expect the acceleration of innovation to continue, other considerations remind us that 
the continuity of earlier patterns is far from inevitable and that innovation does not equate to 
diversity generation. Successful innovations are the product of competition, which is essentially a 
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variety-reducing force. The further generation of new forms is needed if diversity, along with 
future innovation, is to be sustained. 
 
Factors favourable to the sustained pace of innovation relate above all to the level of 
technological knowledge that has been reached and to inherent features of ICT. There have been 
cumulative processes advancing the depth and range of knowledge about electricity from the 18th 
century, with advances building on prior knowledge as science and practice broke through earlier 
barriers. From the beginning of the twentieth century, when Hertz’s discoveries fed Marconi’s 
efforts at broadcasting radio waves, through to mid-century advances in solid state physics, 
knowledge accumulated so that by the end of the century it had reached a critical mass that made 
possible an effervescence of technological advance. Complementary innovations were 
forthcoming in anticipation of the positive selection exerted by demand. Although some co-
evolving developments were unintended (e.g. text messaging along with mobile telephony), overt 
collaboration has been common. We have seen that early selection of a variant by the market 
fostered its propagation as network effects took hold. Amplifying forces created dominant 
standards which provided the basis for further variety through complementary innovations.12 
These coupled evolutionary mechanisms were self-reinforcing. 
 
Unique features of information and communication technologies contributed to the rapid rate of 
innovation: their generic nature, scalability and modularity. ICTs have uses across multiple 
industries and sectors. Increasing returns in software production make software innovations 
highly scalable. The modularity of ICT innovations is conducive to further innovation because it 
allows diverse products and infrastructures to be interoperable through the use of interfaces that 
promote connectivity. There remain myriad markets that have yet to be penetrated by ICT, 
especially in developing countries, which offer prospects for new applications if technological 
capabilities and market needs can be coupled. Cost reductions in mobile telephony represent a 
striking illustration of this possibility. 
 
Moreover it does not require radical advances in knowledge to give rise to radical innovations. 
Incremental innovations that are brought together from different domains may result in new 
species of technology. Different streams of technology, each developing gradually, can give rise 
to major advances. For example, gradual advances in magnetic data storage and in optical 
                                                 
12
 An example of cross-fertilization is provided by storage devices developed for photographic images which turn out to have 
applications for other types of data files.  
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signalling were combined in established companies to provide the basis for video recording. 
Applications of newly combined technologies to entirely new domains of use can sustain 
innovation. 
 
4.1. Uncertainties affect the pace of innovation 
 
Forces favourable to continuing rapid innovation are not the only trends in evidence.  There are 
counter forces at work that make outcomes unpredictable. “The difference between systems that 
are predictable and systems that are not predictable lies in the numbers of degrees of freedom 
they possess … (Bass, 1999, p.236).  Degrees of freedom are all the greater when industries have 
no enduring structure or boundary, contrary to assumptions in industrial economics (Munir and 
Philips, 2002). In ICT industries in particular, the boundaries of industries were reconfigured as 
new products and sectors were spawned, through developments that encompassed workstations, 
hand held devices, Internet-based services and multiple applications in telecommunications. 
 
Among forces that could counter rapid innovation are the intractable requirements of synchrony 
as industries mature and interconnect. On the supply side, the synchronization required for the 
co-evolution of technologies is continually challenged by delays between design and market 
readiness, and lags between investment and returns from sales. Market signals are celebrated for 
spontaneous coordination of supply and demand. They are less effective at re-synchronizing 
temporal de-couplings. The stock market crash of the Millennium points to asynchronies that are 
not corrected by stabilizing market mechanisms but are instead exacerbated by their positive 
feedback effects. In financial markets herd behaviour prevails and the real economy pays for re-
coordination through crisis and slump. The price may rise with the proliferation of derivatives 
which have increased the liquidity that facilitates exchange at the cost of potentially greater 
dislocating effects. 
 
The enabling conditions of the late 20th century had a largely unanticipated impact on innovation. 
Federal investment in science was expected to foster innovation in large companies through a 
linear process in which scientific research eventuated in commercial and social returns (Bush, 
1960). Instead, the most important innovations of the information revolution were made by 
resource-constrained new entrants. This unintended outcome of policy was the result of 
contingent conditions that are not self perpetuating. Selection processes are increasingly 
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supporting big laboratories and established paradigms rather than small innovative teams and 
new ideas. The bureaucratization of science and intellectual property arrangements that benefit 
established players could endanger sources of variety and the selection of new variants. In the 
US, the post World War II judiciary applied an anti-trust regime that made it possible for new 
entrants to challenge established players (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1998). More recently, 
established players who could defend their patents have been favoured by intellectual property 
arrangements and rulings. Pressures on companies to focus on short-term share price gains have 
also increased (Stiglitz, 2003). The slump following the ‘correction’ to share prices in 2000 
greatly reduced the availability of venture capital for experimental new entrants. Such risk averse 
investment conditions make it difficult for new entrants to play the role of agent of change. 
 
In Europe, the standardization of selection conditions has been a goal of policy. These are less 
favourable to the rise of new species of activity than diverse economic habitats providing a 
variety of different selection conditions. Market selection may not provide independent 
mechanisms for variety generation when expected returns from a known set of selection forces 
determine the variants launched on the market. The prospect of low returns have limited the 
extent of innovation in drugs for common diseases and ICT suited to conditions in low income 
economies.13 Rather than becoming more equal, the distribution of income within and between 
countries has become less equitable, limiting the purchasing power of potential consumers of 
ICT innovations and creating the ‘digital divide’, a societal segregation between those with 
access to ICTs and those without. A key influence on diversity will be new selection conditions 
in emergent economies and the response of innovators there to information technologies. 
  
Physical limits to improvements in technical performance have brought waves of innovation to 
an end in the past (Freeman, 1982). But before such limits are reached, there are other factors at 
work that can alter the pace of innovation as technologies and industries mature, notably the 
lock-in of consumers to dominant technologies and asymmetries of market power. Established 
firms can use returns from past successes to innovate. Both Microsoft and Intel, alert to potential 
competition, have attempted regular product updates and innovations. But incumbent firms have 
only rarely shown the capability and incentive to introduce radical innovations (Utterback, 1994; 
Nairn, 2000). It was not until pioneering new entrants had demonstrated the returns to be 
                                                 
13
 Geographic diffusion and diversity of selection regime have taken on new impetus with the growth of the Indian and Chinese 
economies. 
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obtained from microcomputing and the Internet that incumbents imitated their initiatives.14 As 
the Xerox PARC case illustrates, even established companies promoting advanced R&D faced 
inertia that prevented assimilation of the knowledge they generated in their own labs (Rumelt, 
1995). 
 
Along with the acquisition of more innovative entrants, the most likely source of major 
innovations from incumbent companies is the application of a known technology to a new 
domain, often through new combinations (Levinthal, 1998).15 But there are factors relating to 
technical standards and strategic realities that affect the propensity for breakthrough innovation 
in established corporations. Owners of proprietary standards tend to inhibit innovations that 
could threaten their position. Modularity of design allows diversity of provision to coincide with 
standard interfaces, so opening up new domains of application, as in retail payment systems. But 
as Penrose pointed out, there are strategic limits to the new directions in which established 
companies can move (Penrose, 1959). Companies with reputations at risk from uncertain new 
products prefer to manage risk by using tried and tested solutions, or incremental variations 
thereon. Groundbreaking innovations are by their nature risky and are adopted only in 
exceptional conditions by corporate decision makers (Christensen, 1997). Managers under 
pressure to demonstrate short-term share price gains are unlikely to embrace uncertain new 
technology paradigms. 
 
In sum, the evidence we have examined reveals the extent to which market exchange stimulates 
both the multiple variants of goods and services that meet diverse needs and the uniformities that 
make exchange possible. Amplifying processes reinforce emerging concentration and 
asymmetries of market power. Kauffman has shown that as networks mature and become 
interlocking, there is a reduction in the diversity of outcomes (Kauffman, 1996). Whether or not 
this will apply to ICT technologies depends on the interaction of countervailing forces. The close 
coupling of variety generation, selection and propagation has accelerated innovation in ICT over 
the period examined, but this dynamic has depended on a contingent set of favourable conditions, 
including long-term investment in science and technology and incentives for technical 
entrepreneurs. Policy can be directed towards fostering favourable conditions but these are much 
more specific and difficult to provide than an ill-defined ‘climate of enterprise’. 
                                                 
14
 Although IBM established the standard for the PC, it did not enter the market until the basic technology and architecture had 
been tested by more entrepreneurial ventures. This is consistent with the type of risk-reducing strategy that might be expected 
from a large incumbent firm. 
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In the twentieth century, government policies in the home of free markets helped to shape the 
very conditions of supply and demand that gave rise to innovations.  Advances in science, the 
output of skilled technologists and an intellectual property regime favourable to innovation, were 
among the conditions of supply formed by US policy. Demand was influenced by public 
procurement, regulation and fiscal incentives, among other factors (Stiglitz, 2003).  It was an 
unintended consequence of Cold War defence policies that they created munificent conditions 
not only for science but for technology-based enterprise in the USA.16 Radical innovation in the 
private sector resulted from the application of new knowledge made available in the public 
domain by massive public funding on IT research in US companies and universities (Mowery 
and Rosenberg, 1998). In particular, government funding supported the advance of IT from 
invention to market-ready applications, bridging the gap between R&D and market, paving the 
way for profitable venture capital and public listings. 
 
Policies that promoted ICT reveal that supply and demand do not operate as market forces 
independently of government measures and institutions. Supply and demand are the outcome of 
all the complex dynamic forces of selection and variety generation. These include the institution-
based and publicly funded transactions that allocate resources, alongside the choices of private 
consumers and producers. There is no such entity as the market. Market signals are the emergent 
properties of complex processes of exchange. 
 
While the US Cold War policies inadvertently enabled micro-diversity in ICT, this diversity can 
be deliberately fostered in other spheres. For example, current market conditions do not provide 
the capital required for the long term development and commercialization of innovative clean 
technologies. But the experience of ICT indicates that if environmental degradation is to be 
counteracted and the necessary conditions created for rapid innovation in clean technologies, 
public campaigns in support of the natural environment need to be funded as an all out war. The 
record shows that overcoming incumbent and consumer inertia can only be achieved when 
selection conditions counteract asymmetries of power and wealth, allowing scope for initiatives 
at the micro-level enabled by public funding. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
15
 As Darwin emphasized, many branches of the tree of life were eliminated by selection forces, but immense variety was 
possible among the remaining branches.   
16
 The US military provided an intermediary IT customer/funder in cases where market assimilation would have been too slow to 
provide incentives to invent and develop an innovat
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Ferment in the realm of knowledge is a critical feature of radical innovation. The progress of 
ICTs across generations of innovation shows that investment in knowledge yields returns more 
extensive than the capture of gains by originators. Entrepreneurial innovators are stimulated by 
new ideas and often act on them prior to shifts in supply or effective demand. Path breaking 
entrants anticipate and respond to selection forces in a different manner from incumbents. It is 
because they have much less to lose that entrepreneurial ventures pursue opportunities 
overlooked by better resourced players. Although the rate of failure of new entrants is wasteful, 
this failure constitutes the overhead required to generate diversity. Experimental entrants give 
rise to distributed forms of innovation, the costs of which are mitigated by serendipity and the 
triumph of the unexpected. 
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